This is an idea that occurred to me recently in the context of discussion about human freedom. The idea might not be worth much of anything, but I think its at least worth floating here. Open Theism is the theological claim that God does not know with certainty every even that will happen in the future because the future is “open” and might “change.” Frequently this is lambasted by evangelical theologians as being an unorthodox view of God. For instance, the polar opposite of Open Theism, the Reformed theological tradition, makes the claim that God knows with certainty every future event. What is worth asking, however, is how God has this knowledge in Reformed theology, and the answer is that it is because Reformed theology is deterministic- in Reformed theology God knows every future event because God will personally bring about or orchestrate every future event. With that in mind, I think we can construct two arguments for comparison:
Reformed Argument:
- God knows with certainty every event in the future that God will personally bring about or orchestrate.
- God will personally bring about or orchestrate all future events.
- Therefore, God knows with certainty all future events.
Open Theist Argument:
- God knows with certainty every event in the future that God will personally bring about or orchestrate.
- [Human freedom entails that] God will not personally bring about or orchestrate at least some future events.
- Therefore, at least some future events are not known by God with certainty.
The first thing we can notice is that both arguments have the same first premise. The second thing we can notice is that the second premise forms the basis for the difference between the two arguments, with both conclusions following from the two premises. So in evaluating these arguments, the real question is about the second premise of each. Will God personally bring about or orchestrate all future events? What I think this means is that the argument over Open Theism is not an argument about God’s omniscience but one about human freedom. In other words, since both arguments have the same first premise, the question about the orthodoxy of Open Theism is actually a question about the orthodoxy of the second premise of the Open Theist argument- if “free-will” is considered an “orthodox” doctrine, then Open Theism is within the orthodox tradition, as “non-traditional” as its conclusion may seem. Historically, it seems very apparent to me that free will is within the traditions of orthodoxy. So it seems to me Open Theism can be considered an orthodox theological view. What do others think?
NB: This post is not a declaration that I am an open theist. It is merely a thought experiment about whether or not open theism should be considered an orthodox “option” in theology.
There And (Almost) Back Again 